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OBLIGATIONS
H. Alston Johnson I11*
SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS
In Wooten v. Wimberly,' the supreme court addressed the prob-
lem of whether vicarious liability under the Civil Code includes soli-
dary liability between the actual tortfeasor and the person "answera-
ble" for the tort.2 Plaintiff's son was injured on May 7, 1965, when
his bicycle and an automobile driven by another minor, Howard
Wimberly, Jr., collided. Plaintiff brought suit on April 6, 1966 nam-
ing Howard Wimberly, Sr. (the driver's father) and the senior Wim-
berly's liability insurer as defendants. Howard Wimberly, Jr. was not
made a defendant in that suit.' The trial court found young Wimberly
free of fault and denied any recovery against the father. The court of
appeal affirmed,4 and the supreme court denied writs.' Shortly before
the supreme court denied writs, plaintiff filed a second suit in the
same court against Howard Wimberly, Jr., now a major, alleging the
same cause of action against this "new" defendant. Defendant inter-
posed exceptions of prescription, res judicata, collateral estoppel and
improper division of a cause of action; the plea of prescription was
sustained by the trial court, and the plaintiff's suit dismissed. The
other exceptions were not reached." The court of appeal affirmed the
dismissal, and the supreme court granted plaintiff's application for
a writ of review, resulting in the decision presently under discussion.
Plaintiff's main argument to save the second suit was that the
father and the son were solidarily liable to him, and that the suit
against the father had interrupted prescription against the son.7 In
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973). The case is to be the subject of a student note in a
future issue of this Review.
2. The specific persons involved were a parent and a minor child, and the parent's
responsibility under Civil Code article 2318. But the court's remarks seem broad
enough to encompass the liability of a curator for the damages occasioned by an insane
person under his care, masters for their servants, employers for their employees, teach-
ers for their scholars and artisans for their apprentices. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2319-
20.
3. Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 2, Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La.
1973). It is also pointed out in defendant's brief that at the time the first suit was filed,
the minor was in fact a major and could have been sued in his own right.
4. Wooten v. Wimberly, 233 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
5. Wooten v. Wimberly, 256 La. 359, 236 So. 2d 496 (1970).
6. Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 3, Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La.
1973).
7. One objection to the plaintiff's argument is that the issue of the father's liabil-
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ruling against plaintiff and affirming the dismissal on a plea of pre-
scription, the supreme court held that a parent is not solidarily liable
with a minor child for the torts of that child.8
The real objection to the second suit, of course, is that it was an
attempt at relitigation of the identical issue already decided ad-
versely to the plaintiff: was there actionable negligence on the part
of the minor? It is certainly true that "the plaintiff should not twice
vex the court system and the same family and liability insurer with
the identical claim."" And to the extent that Civil Code article 2286
would not bar such an effort as res judicata,' it should perhaps be
amended.
But, as correctly pointed out by the dissent, the only issue before
the court was whether the ruling on the plea of prescription was
correct, the exception of res judicata not having been reached by the
trial court. The essential question was thus that of solidarity between
the father and the son. The court was sharply divided on whether the
articles of the Civil Code are properly read to deny solidarity between
a parent and a minor child for the torts of the latter.
Although the question is admittedly not free of difficulty, it is
submitted that the more reasonable interpretation of the articles is
that solidarity is intended.1' It should be remembered that solidarity
ity to him (and the insurer's liability) was res judicata, regardless of the outcome of
his second suit. It is thus difficult to see how he can maintain that a suit against
persons not liable to him at all interrupted prescription against a second person,
whether or not the claimed liability is solidary. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3552 provides: "A
citation served upon one debtor in solido . . . interrupts the prescription with regard
to all the others and even their heirs." See also LA. Civ. CODE art. 2097. The judgment
that the father and the insurer are not debtors, solidary or otherwise, is final, and
therefore the citation served upon them is not one upon a "debtor" and did not
interrupt prescription as to the son. Disposing of the issue in this fashion would have
obviated the discussion of solidarity in the opinion.
8. The court was divided 5-2 on the result, but apparently 4-3 on the issue of
solidarity.
9. 272 So. 2d at 310 (concurring opinion of Tate, J.).
10. Barham, J., dissenting, suggests that article 2286 would be sufficient to bar
plaintiff's second suit on the theory that the demand is between the same parties, since
as to the plaintiff in a suit on a solidary debt one solidary obligor is the same as the
other solidary obligor. 272 So. 2d at 312.
11. The opposite position was taken by the four justices who believed the obliga-
tion to be non-solidary, and their reasoning can be summarized as follows. Regardless
of whether an obligation in solido is claimed to arise from a contract or from a provision
of law, solidarity is not to be presumed in either case. Though no words are sacrosanct,
"the law which creates the solidary obligation should clearly set forth the requisite
elements of a solidary obligation." 272 So. 2d at 305. Article 2318, although providing
the elements of vicarious liability between parent and child, does not set forth the
requisite elements of a solidary obligation. Specifically, the parent is not a joint tort-
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of debtors is principally for the benefit of the creditor; he may compel
any one of the solidary debtors to pay the entire debt."2 The eventual
settling among the debtors after one has paid the debt is of no concern
to the creditor, 3 and may be based upon their own relationship, be
it one in contract" or one imposed by the law itself.' 5 The articles
recognize that debtors solidary as to the creditor may have differing
relationships among themselves: one may be bound conditionally
while the other is bound "pure and simple,"' 6 or the debt may "con-
cern only one" of the solidary debtors, in which case, among the
debtors, he cannot seek contribution from the others.'7 Absent a spe-
cial relationship of this kind, it is true that a debtor who is solidarily
bound with others to the creditor and discharges the whole debt can
feasor under article 2324 and thus cannot be solidarily liable under its provisions. His
liability is secondary and derivative, and there is no right of contribution in favor of
the child against the father. Without such a right of contribution, "the father . . . is
also without right to claim contribution from the son, contribution being a right ac-
corded to all solidary obligors. See La. Civil Code arts. 2103, 2104." 272 So. 2d at 306.
In sum, "the legal consequences attaching to solidary obligations properly-so-called do
not necessarily extend to the legal responsibility of the father for the torts of his minor
child. For these reasons, the father in this instance was not a solidary co-debtor with
his minor son for the alleged tortious conduct of the son." 272 So. 2d at 307. (Emphasis
added.)
12. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2082, 2091. It is significant that the definition of a solidary
obligation in article 2091 is from the point of view of the creditor looking toward the
debtors: "There is an obligation in solido on the part of the debtors, when they are all
obliged to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the
payment which is made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor."
. 13. As an example, it matters not to the creditor that one of the debtors was or
becomes insolvent, for this burden is borne by the other debtors. LA. CIv. CODE art.
2104. This is, of course, one of the great advantages of solidarity for the creditor.
14. An insured and a liability insurer are, as to the insured party, solidarily liable.
LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1973). The contract of insurance usually provides that the
company will pay any and all sums for which the insured may be held liable for injuries
arising from the insured activity, but there is no question of further contribution on
the insured's part after he has paid his premiums for protection. On the other hand,
the contract of suretyship, though possibly in solido as to the creditor (see LA. Civ.
CODE art. 3045), would normally permit the surety to recover from the principal any
amount he is compelled to pay on the debt. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3052, 3053.
15. The relationships of parent and child or employer and employee, for example,
give rise under the law to a full liability of either member of the relationship to an
injured party, but the right of reimbursement from the tortfeasor to the "answerable"
defendant has been recognized. See, e.g.,. Williams v. Marionneaux, 116 So. 2d 57 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1959).
16. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2092.
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2106: "If the affair for which the debt has been contracted
in solido, concern only one of the co-obligors in solido, that one is liable for the whole
debt towards the other codebtors, who, with regard to him, are considered only as his
securities."
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seek the virile share of the others.' But the mere fact that, for other
reasons thought to be important by the law, this does not always
occur is no reason to withdraw the advantages of solidarity from the
creditor. "
The majority opinion placed particular emphasis on article 2093,
which provides that a solidary obligation is not presumed and must
be expressly stipulated, with the exception that this rule "ceases to
prevail only in cases where an obligation in solido takes place of right
by virtue of some provisions of the law." 2" Finding no provisions in
the vicarious liability articles referring to solidarity (expressly or oth-
erwise), the court felt even the exception in article 2093 was unsatis-
-fled.
This approach overlooks the rationale behind article 2093. Soli-
darity among contractual debtors creates an unusually strong remedy
in the creditor, and it is reasonable to conclude that the lawmaker
wanted an express stipulation of solidarity in order to warn the debt-
ors-presumably, but often not, bargaining from an equal position
with the creditor-that they are creating this right in the creditor.
The same reasoning does not apply when the debtor or debtors are
tortfeasors or those "answerable" for their torts. The imposition of
solidarity arises from the law, not from the bargaining of the parties,
and there is no particular reason, or even an opportunity, to warn a
tortfeasor that he may be creating solidarity between himself and
those answerable for his acts in favor of the injured victim."1 In this
18. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2103, 2104.
19. This viewing of the effects of solidarity of debtors from the creditor's side (to
whom it is the more important) rather than the debtors' would have avoided the
difficulty encountered by the court in Wooten and shown in its statement that the
liability of the father-son relationship cannot be characterized as solidary because
nothing in the relationship enables the son to seek contribution from the father if the
son pays the debt. See 272 So. 2d at 307. The majority does not take notice that even
without the specific provision in the direct action statute, the courts have character-
ized the relationship between the liability insurer and the insured as solidary, and
certainly there is nothing in their relationship that permits either of them to seek
contribution from the other. Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639, 643 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960). The accident did not occur in Louisiana in Dupuy, but due to the terms of the
policy "both the insurer and its insured are obligated for the same debt (namely the
insured's tort liability covered by the policy), and payment made by either of them
satisfied the liability of the other, so that within the statutory definition they are
solidary obligors for the payment of the damages for which the insured is legally liable
within the coverage of the insurance policy."
20. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2093.
21. It might even be said that the redactors intended that solidarity be easily
inferred in delictual vicarious responsibility, since it would work to the benefit of a
party free of any fault.
[Vol. 34
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instance, the "exception" in article 2093 simply means that when the
law creates a relationship between creditor and debtors which has the
characteristics described in article 2091,22 the debtors are solidary as
to the creditor, regardless of their relationship among themselves and
regardless of whether the words are used or not. The majority opinion
recognizes that both father and son are bound for the same debt,
either can be compelled for the whole and that payment by one exon-
erates the other and presumably these characteristics result from
some provisions of law, but then it rejects solidarity. 3
Academic arguments aside, should vicarious liability include sol-
idarity? The court's opinion indicates that the only advantage a
plaintiff will lack when faced with vicarious but non-solidary liability
is the possibility of interrupting prescription by suing any one of the
possible defendants. 4 Is this an advantage that plaintiff should
have?",
It might be appropriate to notice that the principal reason for the
existence of vicarious liability is to provide the injured plaintiff with
a financially responsible defendant or at least one who is able to
spread the burden of the risk in some way.2" This is also the basic
principle of liability insurance. And as to the injured victim, we have
chosen to provide that the insured and the liability insurer are soli-
darily liable, even though there is no right of contribution between
22. See note 12 supra.
23. 272 So. 2d at 305-06.
24. This is not in itself a novel result. In Broussard u. Rosenblum, 5 La. App. 245
(Orl. Cir. 1927), it was held that suit against a defendant who happened to be a minor
did not interrupt prescription against his father, even though the father lived in the
same house and may have had actual notice of the litigation.
25. At least one modern civil code denies to the creditor any interruption of
prescription as to those solidary debtors whom he does not sue, but the same code
grants a five-year prescriptive period on torts in order to give plaintiff time to get his
case in order. See GREEK CIv. CODE arts. 486, 491, 492, 937. Louisiana's short prescrip-
tive period may dictate a different approach. Suppose that plaintiff on the last day of
the prescriptive period sues an employee tortfeasor and the employer on whose payroll
that employee seems to be, only to learn later that the defendant employer can prove
that in fact he is the borrowed employee of another employer. If the employee and the
borrowing employer, because of their relationship, are solidarily liable, the suit against
the employee will have interrupted prescription as to the borrowing employer, who is
the real employer. But if their relationship is one of vicarious but non-solidary liability,
the borrowing employer can escape on a plea of prescription if sued, and the lending
employer on an exception of no cause of action, leaving only the employee to respond
to plaintiff. Is this a desirable result? "Relation back" of an amendment naming the
proper defendant might not be granted.
26. If he is an entrepreneur, he can spread the cost to his customers, or may spread
the burden through insurance. See Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 444,
461 (1923).
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them." This protects the plaintiff from bankruptcy of one defendant
as well as dire consequences of pleading errors. It would be consistent
to argue under the present provisions or to provide with specific
amendments that, for the protection of the injured party, there is
solidary liability between an "answerable" defendant and the tortfea-
sor, but, for the protection of the "answerable" defendant, there is
the possibility of reimbursement from the tortfeasor.
And even if it is not desired to permit a plaintiff faced with a
vicarious liability situation to interrupt prescription as to all defen-
dants by suing any defendant, at least it should be provided that a
suit against the "primary" defendant (the tortfeasor) will interrupt
prescription as to any "answerable" defendant. This is consistent
with the present approach in the Code to the analogous situation of
a principal and a surety, in which a citation served on the principal
will interrupt prescription on the surety,28 but not vice versa."9
The holding in Wooten has produced some interesting argu-
ments. In Tabb v. Norred,30 for example, plaintiff sought recovery for
injuries suffered from a gunshot wound inflicted by Norred, a minor.
Plaintiff sued Norred, Norred's father and their liability insurer as
well as Vincent (another minor), Vincent's father and their liability
insurer. Plaintiff's theory was that the two minors were joint tortfea-
sors and solidarily liable under Civil Code article 2324.
The Norreds and their insurers settled with plaintiff prior to
trial. At the close of the trial against the remaining defendants, a
judgment was entered on the jury verdict of $300,000.00. The judg-
ment condemned the remaining defendants "jointly, severally and in
solido" to pay to plaintiff the specified amount, but with the provi-
sion that as to the minor, the principal amount be reduced by one-
half "as the result of his right of contribution from his co-tortfeasor,"
the other minor, who had settled.3 '
Relying on the decision in Wooten and the fact that the judg-
ment did not reflect a right of contribution by the father of the re-
27. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1958), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 471 § 1.
28. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3553.
29. Succession of Voorhies, 21 La. Ann. 659 (1869). The expression to the contrary
in Cohen v. Golding, 27 La. Ann. 77 (1875) is dicta, since there the principal was sued
first. And in Richard v. Bufman, 14 La. Ann. 144 (1859), cited by the court in Cohen,
the principal and the surety were bound in solido. The other cases cited by the court
in Cohen were instances in which the principal was sued first.
30. 277 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
31. Id. at 230, and agreed to by the parties. Cunningham v. Hardware Mut. Cas.
Co., 228 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d
915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103.
[Vol. 34
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maining tortfeasor, the plaintiff contended that the father had no
right of contribution and could be compelled to pay the entire
$300,000.00 regardless of the earlier settlement. The Third Circuit
rejected that argument on several grounds, the first being that article
2318 nowhere indicates that the person "answerable" for another's
torts must pay more than that person might be compelled to pay.
32
The second was that the fathers of the two minors were solidarily
liable between themselves, and the prior settlement as to the first
father deprived the second of his right to contribution and entitled
the second father to a reduction in the judgment to one-half the
verdict.
33
Although certainly the decision is just on the facts before the
court, one might wonder how this squares with the Wooten reasoning
about solidarity. If we are to reject solidarity between two individuals
unless we find it clearly expressed by some provision of law, whence
comes the solidarity between the fathers of these two joint tortfea-
sors? 34 And is it at all logical to say that a plaintiff can interrupt
prescription as to Parent A, father of one minor tortfeasor, by suing
Parent B, father of another minor tortfeasor, but cannot do so by
suing either A's own child or the other minor tortfeasor?
The majority opinion in Wooten appears to classify vicarious
liability, an obligation with multiple debtors, as neither several, joint
nor solidary 35 but somewhere in between. The situation should be
clarified by judicial reconsideration or legislative amendment.
32. Cf. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3037: "The suretyship can not exceed what may be due
by the debtor, nor be contracted under more onerous conditions."
33. 277 So. 2d at 232.
34. The court cites Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917) in support
of its conclusion. It is true that the judgment entered in that case against two different
parents of two different minors was denominated "in solido," but that is the only time
the phrase appears in the opinion, and there is no discussion of the solidary nature of
the liability and certainly no discussion of any foundation in the Code for such a
conclusion. And the court specifically granted to one of the "solidary" debtors the right
to have "judgment over against" the other "for whatever amount is thus paid by her."
Such a right of indemnity rather than contribution is a factor which led the court in
Wooten to hold such an obligation not solidary at all. The remaining cases cited by
the court in Tabb as approving Sutton did so on the point that it recognized the right
of the vicariously liable defendant or the "technically" or "constructively" liable de-
fendant to complete recovery against the actual tortfeasor.
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2077: "Where there are more than one obligor or obligee
named in the same contract, the obligation it may produce may be either several or
joint or in solido, both as regards the obligor and the obligee."
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USURY
A spate of recent decisions on usury 6 prompts a brief discussion
of Louisiana law on the subject, including the provisions of the new
Louisiana Consumer Credit Law, 37 effective January 1, 1973. To say
that usury is the charging or collecting of an illegal rate of interest
for the lending of money is obviously only to scratch the surface of
the problem, given the number of statutes which deal with "legal"
rates of interest and the ingenuity of lenders in discovering means of
charging interest.
In a very early case, the court was faced with characterizing
usury either as immoral and thus malum in se or merely illegal and
thus only malum prohibitum.5 Plaintiff brought suit to recover a sum
of money paid by him to defendant for money lent at an allegedly
usurious rate of interest. Defendant objected that the money, even if
it represented a usurious rate of interest, had been paid in response
to a natural obligation as defined in articles 1757(2) and 1758(1) of
the Civil Code 11 and thus could not be recovered, citing article
1759(1).21 Rejecting a contrary opinion of Pothier, the court held
usury to be malum prohibitum, producing a natural obligation
which would defeat any suit for recovery of money paid in compliance
with the obligation.
An ingenious plaintiff, a few years later in Rosenda v. Zabriskie,"
reasoned that since an agreement for usurious interest created a natu-
ral obligation, and since a natural obligation is sufficient cause for a
36. Budget Plan of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Talbert, 276 So. 2d 297 (La. 1973) (reten-
tion of jurisprudential rule that borrower cannot demand rebate of capitalized interest
if he accelerates payment of the note, in the absence of fraud or coercion; refinancing
was undertaken at borrower's request and thus capitalized interest from first note
deemed properly payable in second); Thrift Funds of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Jones, 274
So. 2d 150 (La. 1973); Epps v. Bowie, 271 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Miley
v. Steedley, 269 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
37. LA. R.S. 9:3510-68 (Supp. 1973).
38. Perrillat v. Puech, 2 La. 428 (1831).
39. Article 1757(2) provides: "2. A natural obligation is one which can not be
enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who makes it, in conscience and
according to natural justice."
Article 1758(l) provides: "Natural obligations are of four kinds: 1. Such obliga-
tions as the law has rendered invalid for the want of certain forms or for some reason
of general policy, but which are not in themselves immoral or unjust .. "
40. "Although natural obligations can not be enforced by action, they have the
following effect: 1. No suit will lie to recover what has been paid, or given in compliance
with a natural obligation."
41. 2 La. at 430-31.
42. 4 Rob. 493 (1843).
[Vol. 34
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new contract,": a renewal note containing usurious interest from a
prior rate is not vulnerable to a plea of usury. The court correctly
rejected the argument, visualizing the distinct possibility that "re-
covery could be had for any amount of usurious interest, if the con-
tract had been reduced to writing, and then renewed.""
This meant, in effect, that the courts were not open to litigants
seeking refunds of usurious interest already paid or seeking collection
of usurious interest contracted for. Since that time, a number of
special statutes have been passed.45 One of these, the Small Loan
Law, authorized very high rates of interest on loans under $300.00,
but also provided that any interest charged or received in excess of
the amount permitted would render the contract "void and the licen-
see shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or
charges whatever."",
Loans in excess of $300.0011 remained subject to the general prin-
ciples of Civil Code article 2924, the basic article on usury, but it, too,
had undergone some changes over the years. A specific right of recov-
ery of usurious interest paid was recognized, first with a prescription
of one year" and then two years.4" Shortly after the Rosenda decision,
a statute was passed" ' which was interpreted to permit "discounting"
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1759(2).
44. Significantly, the court added: "neither the renewal of the contract, nor any
devices to evade the law can be countenanced." 4 Rob. at 498. At the time, the practice
of discounting or capitalizing interest was not authorized by article 2924. The legal rate
of interest was then 10 percent. La. Civ. Code art. 2895 (1825). Perhaps another reason
for rejecting the plaintiff's argument would have been that although article 1759 states
that a natural obligation is a "sufficient" cause for a new contract, it does not address
itself to the "legality" of the cause, which is of course also a requirement. LA. CiV. CODE
art. 1893.
45. Among these were the Louisiana Small Loan Act, La. R.S. 6:571-93 (now
repealed by the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law); the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act; La. R.S. 6:951-64 (specifically recognized by Louisiana Consumer Credit Law and
conflicts with the consumer credit law to be resolved in favor of Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act); and the Direct Vehicle Loan Company Act, La. R.S. 6:970-76 (now
repealed by the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law).
46. La. R.S. 6:583 (1950), repealed by Acts 1972, No. 454 § 2 (as it read prior to
repeal). But even in the face of that statute, it was held that a defendant who had
received $250.00 through two loans from plaintiff later held to be unenforceable be-
cause of excess interest could not recover on his reconventional demand for the $190.00
he had paid on the notes. Commonwealth Finance Co. v. Livingston, 12 So. 2d 44 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1943). The theory of this decision was apparently that there was always
a natural obligation to repay at least the principal.
47. And made with security other than motor vehicles.
48. La. Acts. 1844, No. 25 § 2.
49. La. Acts 1908, No. 68 § 1.
50. La. Acts 1860, No. 62 § 1.
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to avoid the eight per cent maximum interest rate otherwise provided
by article 2924, and that provision was included in the revised article
2924 in the 1870 code, now appearing as article 2924(7)."' Under this
provision, as long as the lender precomputed the interest and in-
cluded it in the face amount of the note, there was no limit to the
amount of capitalized interest which might be included provided that
a maximum of eight per cent interest after maturity could be in-
cluded.12 The jurisprudence recognized this practice in a number of
cases.53 The jurisprudence also established a corollary: although the
lender had to rebate the proportionate unearned interest if he chose
to accelerate the note,54 the borrower could not demand rebate of the
precomputed interest if he chose to accelerate the note.55 As to all of
51. Louisiana Civil Code article 2924 as it appeared after the minor prescriptive
amendment of 1908 and prior to the amendments of 1970 and 1972 provided: "Interest
is either legal or conventional. Legal interest is fixed at the following rates, to wit:
"At five per cent on all sums which are the object of a judicial demand. Whence
this is called judicial interest;
"And on sums discounted at banks at the rate establisheo1 by their charters.
"The amount of the conventional interest cannot exceed eight per cent. The same
must be fixed in writing; testimonial proof of it is not admitted in any case.
"Except in the cases herein provided, if any persons shall pay on any contract a
higher rate of interest than the above, as discount or otherwise, the same may be sued
for and recovered within two years from the time of such payment.
"The owner or discounter of any note or bond or other written evidence of debt
for the payment of money, payable to order or bearer or by assignment, shall have the
right to claim and recover the full amount of such note, bond or other written evidence
of debt and all interest not beyond eight per cent per annum interest that may accrue
thereon, notwithstanding that the rate of interest or discount at which the same may
be or may have been discounted has been beyond the rate of eight per cent per annum
interest or discount; but this provision shall not apply to the banking institutions of
this State in operation under existing laws.
"The owner of any promissory note, bond or other written evidence of debt for the
payment of money to order or bearer or transferrable [transferable] by assignment
shall have the right to collect the whole amount of such promissory note, bond or other
written evidence of debt for the payment of money, notwithstanding such promissory
note [,J bond or other written evidence of debt for the payment of money may include
a greater rate of interest or discount than eight per cent per annum; provided such
obligation shall not bear more than eight per cent per annum after maturity until paid.
"Provided however where usury is a defense to a suit on a promissory note or other
contract of similar character, that it is permissible for the defendant to show said usury
whether same was given by way of discount or otherwise, by any competent evidence."
52. See Note, 29 LA. L. REV. 562 (1969).
53. Budget Plan of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Talbert, 276 So. 2d 297 (La. 1973);
Mayfield v. Nunn, 239 La. 1021, 121 So. 2d 65 (1960); Vosbien v. Leopold, 230 La. 21,
87 So. 2d 715 (1956); General Sec. Co. v. Jumonville, 216 La. 681, 44 So. 2d 702 (1950);
Clasen v. Excel Fin. Causeway, Inc., 170 So.2d 924 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
54. Berger v. DeSalvo, 156 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
55. Williams v. Alphonse Mort. Co., 144 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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these practices, the lender's principal worry was a forfeiture of inter-
est statute providing simply that "any contract for the payment of
interest in excess of that authorized by law shall result in the forfei-
ture of the entire interest so contracted."5 Would that include excess
capitalized interest, supposedly authorized by article 2924 and the
jurisprudence?
That question was resolved in the recent term in Thrift Funds
of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Jones.7 Defendant Jones applied to plaintiff
for a loan of $650.00. To obtain that sum, Jones signed a note in 1967
promising to pay $1152.00 in 48 installments of $24.00 each. The face
amount represented the sum of the actual cash advanced ($650.00)
plus $50.00 to an attorney furnished by the finance company and
$452.00 of capitalized interest-321/2 per cent per annum interest on
the declining balance of a $700.00 loan. The 1967 note also provided
for annual eight per cent interest on each installment from maturity
until paid.
During the next 28 months, Jones paid to plaintiff a total of
$682.00 (28 payments of $24.00 plus a $10.00 "extension fee" on a
missed installment).Because of various "late charges" assessed
against Jones, however, plaintiff's records credited him with a lower
amount paid and showed a balance due of $522.00 on October 18,
1969.
On that date, Jones sought to borrow another $100.00. This time,
he signed a note with a face amount of $1277.76, payable in 48 install-
ments of $26.62 each. This amount represented actual cash advanced
of $100.00; $7.00 for "recordation and cancellation charges"; $522,
balance of old note; and finance charges of $650.76-41 per cent per
annum. This note bore interest at eight per cent per annum on any
unpaid balance at maturity on November 20, 1973. Certain payments
on the second note were delinquent by 15 days, and "default charges"
were assessed against Jones for this reason. When Jones ceased pay-
ments on the second note after five payments, plaintiff brought suit
for the alleged balance due of $1144.66 plus interest and attorney's
fees.
Citing Civil Code article 2924(7), the court held that the various
"late charges" assessed against Jones constituted usurious interest,
56. LA. R.S. 9:3501 (1950). The source of this statute was Rev. St. 1870, § 1884,
which was in turn drawn from the provisions of La. Acts 1844, No. 25 § 1 and La. Acts
1855, No. 291 § 2. The acts of 1844 and 1855 had each limited conventional interest
rates to eight per cent in place of the former ten per cent, "under pain of forfeiture of
the entire interest so contracted." This phrase was not, however, included in the
revised article 2924 of the Code of 1870.
57. 274 So. 2d 150 (La. 1973).
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because they were far in excess of the eight per cent per annum from
maturity authorized on notes already containing capitalized interest,
or "discount." This conclusion compelled consideration of the mean-
ing of "entire interest" to be forfeited under R.S. 9:3501.
Noting a conflict in the prior jurisprudence and noting the stat-
ute's intent to penalize usurious creditors, 9 the court concluded that
plaintiff would have to forfeit the capitalized interest as well as the
clearly usurious interest. It reached the laudable and logical conclu-
sion that interest under any other name costs just as much:
We conclude, therefore, that, when (as here) illegally usu-
rious interest is exacted by virtue of a contractual arrangement,
La. R.S. 9:3501 requires the forfeiture of all interest under the
contract, whether such be stipulated interest, capitalized inter-
est, or other charges for the use of or the delay in paying money,
howsoever, denoted.5"
But Jones was not finished. He also claimed that, since all
interest on the 1967 note was also forfeited under H.S. 9:3501 because
of the "late charges," the actual amount advanced to him in 1969 was
the principal balance due on the 1967 note (no more than $128.00)
plus the new advance of $107.00-a total of $235.00. This brought the
1969 loan within the Small Loan Act 0 and its stringent sanction of
forfeiture of "principal, interest or charges whatever" by a usurious
lender."1 The court agreed with that contention and as a consequence
dismissed plaintiff's suit on the note altogether.2
Jones was of course litigated prior to the effective date of the
Louisiana Consumer Credit Law, but it is nonetheless instructive
since the two together appear to forge some effective protections for
the debtor. Space does not permit, and the writer is not competent
to provide, an exhaustive analysis of the new law. But several obser-
vations can be made.
First, the ruling should certainly apply to all notes contracted
prior to January 1, 1973. Second, although the new law repeals the
58. Id. at 155-56.
59. Id. at 157.
60. La. R.S. 6:571-93 (1950) repealed January 1, 1973 by the Louisiana Consumer
Credit Law, LA. R.S. 9:3510-68 (Supp. 1973).
61. La. R.S. 6:583 as it read prior to repeal.
62. 274 So. 2d at 161. The court further strengthened the debtor's position by
correctly interpreting article 2924(5) as a two-year prescription on actions to recover
usurious interest paid, not on defenses to an action brought on a note on which usurious
interest is sought to be, or has been, collected.
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Small Loan Act63 which was so helpful to Jones and provides new
interest limitations on specified loan amounts, 4 it does not expressly
repeal La, R.S. 9:3501. Thus, a debtor might now choose a defense
based upon the interest-rate limitations of the new law and the sanc-
tions of the forfeiture statute, which broadly reaches contracts with
interest "in excess of that authorized by law." The new law does
provide its own sanctions (refund of "all loan finance charges"'6 - plus
three times that amount together with reasonable attorney's fees),66
but this is only available when the debtor proves an "intentional
violation," a difficult burden as defined by the Act.67
This combination of the old forfeiture rule as interpreted in Jones
and the interest-rate limitations in the new statute may permit a
debtor to escape payment of usurious interest, capitalized or othe-
wise, in a situation in which he cannot discharge the burden of prov-
ing an intentional violation. In such a situation, the consumer credit
law requires only that "the court may require the extender of credit
to correct the violation."" This may or may not include forfeiture of
all interest; it could just as well be interpreted to involve rebate of
the usurious interest only. If the latter be the interpretation, the
63. La. Acts 1972, No. 454 § 2.
64. LA. R.S. 9:3519 authorizes a maximum of "36 per cent per year for that portion
of the unpaid principal amount of the loan not exceeding $800.00" and smaller percen-
tages on larger amounts.
65. LA. R.S. 9:3516 (20) defines these as "the sum of (a) all charges payable
directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the lender
as an incident to the extension of credit, including any of the following types of charges
that are applicable: interest or any amount payable under a point, discount, or other
system of charges, however denominated, premium or other charge for any guarantee
or insurance protecting the lender against the consumer's default or other credit loss;
and (b) charges paid by the consumer for investigating the collateral or credit worthi-
ness of the consumer or for commission or brokerage for obtaining the credit, irrespec-
tive of the person to whom the charges are paid or payable unless the lender had no
notice of the charges when the credit extension was made. The term does not include
default charges, delinquency charges, deferral charges, or any of the items enumerated
in [subsection 3(b) of this section]." This appears to indicate that "late charges" such
as those imposed upon Jones would, if agreed upon and if within the "5% of the unpaid
amount of the installment but not exceeding $5.00" limitation of R.S. 9:3525, be
collectible and would not constitute a higher rate of interest than the amount specified
in R.S. 9:3519.
66. LA. R.S. 9:3552A(1)(a) (Supp. 1972) (effective 1973).
67. See LA. R.S. 9:3552 (Supp. 1972) (effective 1973).
68. LA. R.S. 9:3552A(2)(a) (Supp. 1972) (effective 1973). The act adds "but the
consumer is not entitled to the civil remedies granted by this section." This is presum-
ably intended to apply to the earlier treble-damage provision, and could well be inter-
preted to indicate a limitation on recovery to only those amounts constituting a viola-
tion, in those situations where the debtor can only prove an "unintentional" violation.
244 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
debtor who cannot prove an intentional violation has more protection
now against the unscrupulous lender than he would under the new
Act.
